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PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT UNDER RULE lOb-5:
AN INJUNCTION FOR A CORPORATE ISSUER?
One of the most difficult problems which has confronted courts in
interpreting the securities acts has been the degree to which private
remedies should be afforded for their enforcement. The plaintiff in
Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp.' sought to expand the
scope of private enforcement of section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934,2 contending that a corporate issuer of stock has
the right under SEC rule 10b-5 ' to enjoin manipulation of its
securities.
Studebaker alleged that defendants 4 had conspired to gain control
of Studebaker by means of "fraudulent and unlawful acts in violation
of the Exchange Act." ' After Studebaker's rejection of a merger
proposal, defendants initiated a campaign designed to wrest control
of the company's board of directors. Defendants allegedly filed mis-
leading proxy materials in violation of section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act of 1934 8 and, through allegedly false representations, artificially
distorted the market price of Studebaker stock in violation of sections
9(a) 7 and 10(b) of the act. The district court dismissed Studebaker's
claim for injunctive relief under section 10, applying the traditional
doctrine that only purchasers or sellers are entitled to bring private
1256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
248 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
3 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964) :
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in an act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
4 The defendants were a corporation, a brokerage house and an individual senior
partner of the brokerage house.
5 Brief for Appellant, p. 3, Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., No. 17253,
6th Cir., May 25, 1966, appeal dismissed, New York Times, Dec. 31, 1966, p. 27, col. 3.
648 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
748 Stat. 889 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78i(a) (1964).
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actions under section 10 and rule 10b-5. 8 Evidence was taken as to
the alleged violation of section 14(a) and, although the court refused
to enjoin the solicitation of proxies, it did order that the proxy contest
be supervised by the court.9
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Studebaker urged a novel argu-
ment opposing dismissal of the complaint under section 10(b), contend-
ing (1) that as an issuer of stock, it "has a duty to maintain the
market [for its stock] . . . free from manipulative distortion," "0
(2) that defendants, through their misrepresentations, were distorting
the market in contravention of rule 10b-5, and (3) that the rationale
of J. I. Case Co. v. Borak "l and Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin ' allows
a corporation to enforce the federal securities regulations through
injunctive relief. Judicial acceptance of this argument would signif-
icantly broaden private 10b-5 actions. Studebaker's appeal was dis-
missed, however, when the parties settled their dispute out of court.3
The district court held that Studebaker lacked standing to bring
the 10b-5 action because it was neither a purchaser nor a seller of
securities.' 4  The language of rule 10b-5-that it is unlawful to use
deception or fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" '8 --was the basis for this decision. The right of a private
party to maintain an action under section 10(b), as well as the re-
striction of parties to purchasers or sellers, stems from decisional law
and has been applied only in actions for damages caused by a rule
10b-5 violation.' To determine whether this limitation should be
applied against a corporate issuer seeking injunctive relief, it is neces-
sary to examine its origin.
Section 10 of the Exchange Act does not provide for enforcement,
either by private parties or the Securities and Exchange Commission;
it merely states that certain activities proscribed by the SEC shall be
unlawful. The enforcement power for section 10 is found in section
21(e),' 7 which permits the SEC to transmit evidence of violations
8 256 F. Supp. at 179-80.
D Id. at 188-90.
10 Brief for Appellant, p. 28, Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., No. 17253,
6th Cir., May 25, 1966, appeal dismissed, New York Times, Dec. 31, 1966, p. 27, col. 3.
11377 U.S. 426 (1964) (derivative action for damages and rescission of merger
sustained where defendants had acquired shareholder approval through a misleading
proxy statement in violation of § 14(a)).
32 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966) (injunction upheld which prohibited use of stock-
holder authorizations acquired through means in violation of § 14(a)).
13 New York Times, Dec. 31, 1966, p. 27, col. 3.
14 Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Prods. Corp., CCH Fm). SEc. L. RsE. 91,669, at
95,459, aff'd on reconsideration, 256 F. Supp. 173, 179-80 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
16 See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
1148 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1964):
(e) Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person engaged
or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will consti-
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to the Attorney General for prosecution and gives the SEC power to
bring an action to enjoin violations. Section 27,'8 which grants ex-
clusive jurisdiction to the district courts for "all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
chapter or the rules or regulations thereunder," "9 is the jurisdictional
basis for private section 10 actions. In 1946, a private party for the
first time was allowed to maintain a damage action for a rule 10b-5
violation, upon showing that he was defrauded into selling his stock
for an amount substantially less than its worth.2" The district court
noted that no private party actions were explicitly provided for by the
act for a section 10 violation, but held that injury stemming from the
violation of a statute was an actionable tort 2 and that section 27
implied that there would be federal jurisdiction for such suits. 2
A limit on the use of lOb-5 in private actions was judicially im-
posed in 1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.3 Newport's
directors allegedly rejected a favorable merger offer and then sold
their majority control of the company at a large premium. Specific
acts of fraud were alleged: it was charged that defendants made mis-
representations in letters to Newport shareholders both at the time of
the merger negotiations and after the sale of control. The district
court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause of action, and the
Second Circuit affirmed on two grounds: (1) private actions under
rule lOb-5 may only be brought by a person who has bought or sold,2 4
tute a violation of the provisions of this chapter, or of any rule or regulation
thereunder, it may in its discretion bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States or the United States courts of any Territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, to enjoin such
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. The Com-
mission may transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts
or practices to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute
the necessary criminal proceedings under this chapter.
1848 Stat 902 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
19 Ibid.
2 o Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), inodified,
73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
21 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 286 (1965):
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the
requirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part
(a) to protect a class of persons which included the one whose
interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has
resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from
which the harm results.
22 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
23 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), criticized in Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. Ra,. 725, 832-35 (1956).
24 193 F.2d at 463.
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and (2) the breach of fiduciary duty complained of was not the type of
evil intended to be covered by the act.'
The second ground for decision in Birnbaun-that section 10(b)
"was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or fraudulent
practice usually associated with the purchase or sale of securities
rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs" 26_
has generally been accepted by the courts,2 7 reflecting both a reluctance
of federal courts to preempt areas of traditional state law concern 21
and an attempt to restrict 10b-5 actions to cases where the securities
transaction plays a major role in the fraudulent scheme.
This second holding in Birnbaum might appear applicable to the
Studebaker facts, but the district court did not consider this question.
Although the transactions were part of a proxy battle for control of
the corporation, a matter typically regulated by state law, an abuse
of the securities trading process was still at the heart of the trans-
action,29 and the remedies provided by state law to correct such abuses
are generally inadequate.3" It would frustrate the policy of the 1934
act if rule 10b-5 were denied application in a case where a securities
transaction was an integral part of the fraud merely because some
encroachment upon state law would be necessary."' Moreover, section
28(a) of the Exchange Act 3 2 permits a remedy under the act in addi-
tion to any state and other federal remedies.33
A principal objection to Studebaker's standing stems from man-
agement's possible motives. Arguably, Studebaker management
brought the 10b-5 action primarily to preserve its own control, rather
than to protect its shareholders. If this were so, it would seem in-
appropriate to allow management to use the corporation's name and
resources for its own preservation.3 However, this objection could
25 Id. at 464.
26 Ibid.
21 See O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Chashin v. Mencher,
255 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump
Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp.
549, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1963); cf. Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir.
1964); New Park Mining Co. v. Cranmer, 225 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28 Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. R.v. 725, 834 (1956).
29 See id. at 835.
303 Loss, SEcURrriEs REGuLATIOn 1430-35 (2d ed. 1961); Fleischer, "Federal
Corporation Law": An Assessmnent, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1146, 1175 (1965).
31 O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964) (dictum) ; cf. Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965).
3248 Stat. 903 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1964): "The rights and remedies
provided by this chapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies
that may exist at law or in equity ... 
3 3 Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1960). See Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369, 375 (D. Del. 1965): "Where
. . . federal rights are concerned this Court is free to fashion federal law regardless
of state corporation law."
34 Cf. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey,
39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); Martin v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del.
Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952).
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be met by denying standing where the motive of the corporate officers
is improper, while leaving open the possibility of corporate standing
to enjoin rule lOb-5 violations where there is a legitimate corporate
purpose.35
In dismissing the lOb-5 action in Studebaker, the district court
relied on the first holding in Birnbaum that such actions are limited
to purchasers and sellers. The Birnbaum court supported its holding
by examining the language of rule lOb-5, concluding that it was "abun-
dantly clear" " that the legislative history limited actions to persons
who had either bought or sold. The court held that since section
17(a) of the 1933 act" prohibited only frauds "upon the purchaser"
of securities and the SEC release announcing promulgation of rule
lOb-5 expressed an intent to close this loophole,"8 the "only purpose"
of section 10(b) was to give sellers the same protection as purchasers.
This interpretation assumed that the words "any person" were
synonymous with "purchaser and seller" and that Congress intended
nothing more than to close the loophole in the 1933 act. The plaintiff
in Birnbaum argued that the "in connection with" clause exhibited
a congressional intent to make unlawful all deceitful conduct affecting
any person when a securities transaction was involved. The 1933
act makes unlawful fraud "in the offer or sale of any securities." 3'
If the 1934 act were intended only to close the loophole, Congress
could have prohibited fraudulent practices "in a purchase or sale, or
an offer to purchase or sell any securities." But, instead, language
of considerably broader scope-"in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security"-was employed. Nonetheless, the district court
in Birnbaum dismissed plaintiff's argument, insisting that the statute
was not designed to cover the injury alleged.
The court's interpretation of the legislative history has been
strongly criticized.40 The fact that the SEC release announced an
35 It will often be difficult for a court to determine the true motive of management;
in the usual case management will be able to adduce a colorable corporate purpose
to support its actions. This might be resolved in part by presuming that management
in a proxy battle is motivated by self-interest, therefore shifting the burden to them
to prove that their motives are proper. Cf. Cheff v. Mathes, supra note 34. In any
event, it is recognized that some parties will obtain standing who should not have it.
Nonetheless, the advantages of injunctive corporate enforcement of lOb-5 outweigh
the disadvantage of having some improper parties.
36Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952).
3748 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
38 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
3948 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1964).
40 Leech, spra note 28, at 833; Comment, 32 TEXAs L. REV. 197, 206-07 (1953);
Comment, 100 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1251, 1253 n.17 (1952). See McManus v. Jessup &
Moore Paper Co., 5 S.E.C. Judicial Decisions 810 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (motion to dismiss
denied without opinion where complaint alleged violations of 10b-5 under circumstances
similar to those in Birnbaum). See also Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.,
241 F. Supp. 369, 372 n.3a (D. Del. 1965), which casts some doubt on the purchaser-
seller limitation of Birnbaum by noting that its decision was made without either
affirming or rejecting Birnbaum's interpretation of 10b-5.
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intent to close the loophole should not foreclose a broader interpreta-
tion, and certainly it is not conclusive evidence of congressional intent.
At most, it has been said, the plight of injured parties who were not
purchasers or sellers was not considered by Congress." Nonetheless,
many courts have blindly followed Birnbaum's purchaser-seller limita-
tion without further consideration of the criticism which it has
engendered.'
Several recent cases, allowing "aborted sellers" to maintain
actions when there was no sale prompted by the fraud, have begun
to expand the reach of the "in connection with" clause.43 In Stockwell
v. Reynolds & Co.,44 the plaintiff was induced by his broker's mis-
representations to retain a poor investment. After later discovering
the truth and selling, Stockwell sued under section 10 to recover his
loss. The court rejected the defendant's claim that the misrepresenta-
tion was not made as part of a purchase or sale, reasoning that injury
had resulted from a fraud in connection with a sale, and that such a
holding furthered the intent of the act "to protect the investors against
fraud." 45 In M. L. Lee & Co. v. American Cardboard & Packaging
Corp.,46 an underwriter's refusal to purchase stock as agreed in an
underwriting contract was held actionable under rule 10b-5 as fraud
"in connection with" a sale of securities. The court held that an
actual sale was not necessary and that fraud affecting a contract to
sell was within the scope of rule 10b-5.4T
The "in connection with" clause was also liberally construed in
Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp.45 Plaintiff did not tender
his shares pursuant to a tender offer and, at the time of the litigation,
had yet to sell. However, when the offeror, through allegedly fraudu-
lent statements, had acquired enough shares to effect a short-form
merger with a dummy corporation, plaintiff became obligated under
Delaware law to sell his stock to the merged company either at the
41 Comment, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1251, 1253 n.17 (1952).
42 See, e.g., Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) ; Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
43.But see DeGatano v. Steele, CCH FE. SEc. L. REP. It 91,671 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 22, 1966) (action denied to a nonselling shareholder for damages suffered
by his inability to sell his stock because the defendant, through deceit, had caused
nontransferrable stock to be issued to shareholders in place of negotiable securities) ;
Keers & Co. v. American Steel & Pump Corp., 234 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
see discussion in Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer,
115 U. PA. L. REv. 317, 361 n.176 (1967).
44252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). It is arguable, however, that this is not
an "aborted seller" case since Stockwell eventually sold his stock and the fraud
continued until the sale.
45 Id. at 219.
4636 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
47The court based its holding on § 3(a) (14) of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat 882
(1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (14) (1964), which includes "a contract to
sell" in its definition of "a sale."
48241 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965). Cf. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., No. 30500,
2d Cir., March 13, 1967. The court found it unnecessary to consider the SEC's
amicus argument that one need not be a selling shareholder to sue under lOb-5,
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tender price or at an amount determined through an appraisal. The
court, in finding standing under 10b-5, held that since a shareholder
upon purchase of his shares contracts by state law to sell upon demand
to the survivor of a short-form merger, any fraud affecting that
contract was in connection with plaintiff's "sale":
The frauds allegedly perpetrated upon plaintiff were, in
a very real sense, related to a vital part of the contract .
under which plaintiff had agreed to sell. They were com-
mitted "in connection with the purchase [and] . . . sale"
of a security within the meaning of Rule lOb-5. Any other
view of the transaction would defeat the purpose of Rule
10b-5 . . .49
Although the foregoing cases might be distinguishable from
third-party cases in that the former concerned frauds affecting would-be
parties to securities transactions, these cases nonetheless evidence
a judicial willingness to broaden the strict purchaser-seller limitation
expressed in Birnbaum.
A strong argument for the strict purchaser-seller limitation has
been that if a third party to a transaction should recover damages
suffered by the purchaser or seller, he would be unjustly enriched.
Kremer v. Selheimer 50 is representative of this argument. Plaintiff,
a receiver in bankruptcy, alleged that the company was defrauded
when defendant officers bought shares from the company below market
price and sold them at a price inflated through the fraud of the broker.
The court dismissed a damage action because the injury was to the
purchasers, not the corporation:
[T]he amended complaint fails to place [plaintiff] . . . in
the category of defrauded seller and it is, therefore, fatally
deficient. [Plaintiff] . . . has misconstrued the scope and
purpose of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. His construction
would entitle . . . the issuing corporation to claim the fruits
of the fraud and deception which he contends was practiced
by defendants on purchasers of [its] . . . stock. I read no
intent in the legislation or the Rule to confer such a benefit
on the issuing corporation."'
This basis for retaining the Birnbaum limitation has also been
questioned. In Pettit v. American Stock Exch.," a corporate cause
49 241 F. Supp. at 374.
50 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ; accord, Defiance Indus., Inc. v. Galdi, 256
F. Supp. 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (damage action against a broker for injury to corpo-
ration by statements derogatory to company, forcing the stock price down).
51215 F. Supp. at 553. (Emphasis added.)
52217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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of action for damages was successful where defendants allegedly
violated rule lOb-5 in connection with two distributions of a cor-
poration's securities: in the first the corporation issued stock in ex-
change for worthless assets, and in the second the stock was then
distributed to the public on an allegedly rigged market. Defendants
challenged the corporate cause of action as to the second transaction,
claiming that the injury was to the investors, not to the corporation.
The court upheld federal jurisdiction under rule 10b-5, noting that
both transactions were part of a continuous scheme to defraud the
company. In significant dicta the court added:
[T]he elements of this case make it particularly appropriate
for the recognition of federal rights of the corporation ...
Defendants appear to concede that investors in Swan-Finch
stock may have been damaged by their acts, and that appro-
priate Section 10(b) liability would lie in such cases. This
concession offers only a limited solution to the defrauded
parties, as there are serious practical obstacles to the success-
ful prosecution of a lawsuit on behalf of an extremely large
and scattered class of persons, each of whose potential re-
covery is limited. . . . In view of these facts, it is clear that
the inclusion of this cause of action within Section 10(b)
represents a warranted exercise of federal jurisdiction in an
effort to accomplish what Congress intended-the protection
of the integrity of stock transactions.6
Even if the Birnbaum purchaser-seller limitation is valid in
damage suits, it cannot justifiably be applied in an action to enjoin a
1Ob-5 violation. The tenor of the Exchange Act is prophylactic, and
its intent is to prevent securities frauds. 4  Injunctions are surely an
appropriate remedy to maintain a fair and honest stock market and
are the only method of preventing injury to innocent investors. The
chief argument, other than possible intrusion upon state law, against
allowing a third party to sue in damage actions-that there would be
unjust enrichment to the third party 5-- is clearly inapplicable in an
injunction case.
It might be urged that a legislative decision was made, and ex-
pressed in section 21(e),15 to vest exclusive power in the SEC to
531d. at 27-28.
C4The House Resolution calling for regulation of the securities exchanges
proclaimed that the 1934 act would "prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
[stock] exchanges." H.R. Res. 363, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). Section 2 of the
Exchange Act, entitled "Necessity for Regulation," explains that the act is "to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in [stock] transactions." 48 Stat. 881
(1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964).
55 See Kremer v. Selheimer, 215 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Pa. 1963); text accom-
panying notes 50-51 supra.
5648 Stat. 899 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78u(e) (1964). The text of
§ 21(e) is quoted in note 17 supra,
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enforce the act through injunctive relief." But there is little support
for such a position, since the act neither specifically limits injunctive
relief to the SEC nor excludes private parties. Courts have rejected
similar expressio unius est exciusio alterius " arguments in litigation
concerning standing under the Exchange Act. 9 Indeed, the 1964
case of Ruckle v. Roto American Corp.' permitted standing to a
private party seeking injunctive relief in a 10b-5 action. In reversing
the district court, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had standing
to enjoin a stock issuance which allegedly was the product of fraud
by a majority of the board of directors:
[I] t is far more likely that, as a result of the fraud perpetrated
upon the corporation, overvalued stock may reach the market.
Of course, it was precisely the fear that such securities would
be publicly distributed which prompted Congress to enact
the federal securities laws.01
Strong support for granting standing to a corporation seeking
equitable relief is found in the proxy area. In J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak,"2 plaintiff alleged that a merger was approved only because
of the dissemination of false and misleading materials by the board
of directors. The Supreme Court refused to dismiss the case though
defendant urged that no private action existed under section 14:
Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action. As in anti-trust treble
damage litigation, the possibility of civil damages or injunc-
tive relief serves as a most effective weapon in the enforce-
ment of the proxy requirements.
The corporation is thus cast in the role of a policeman helping the
SEC to enforce the proxy rules. The Borak Court also emphasized
the difficulty that the SEC faces in trying to uncover all violations
of the act,"4 and stressed the necessity of providing effective remedies:
.
57 Cf. Goldsmith v. Western & So. Life Ins. Co., 5 S.E.C. Judicial Decisions
795 (N.D. Ohio 1948) (private plaintiff held to have no right to sue under § 21 (e)).
58 "Expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." BLACK, LAW DICTION-
ARY 692 (4th ed. 1951). The argument is that since Congress specifically allowed
the SEC to seek injunctive relief and did not mention private injunctive suits, Congress
intended that private parties be excluded.
59 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946),
modified, 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); 2 Loss, SEcuRrrrEs REGULATION 937-46
(2d ed. 1961) ; Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law": An Assessment, 78 HARv. L.
R . 1146, 1158 (1965); 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rzv. 1150, 1156-57 (1965); 31 U. CHl. L.
REv. 328, 335-36 (1964) ; ef. SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51
(1943) ; Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208-10 (6th Cir. 1961),
criticized in Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
60 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
61 Id. at 28.
62 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
63Id. at 432.
6 4 Id. at 432-33. See also Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by
Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 360-61 (1967).
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We, therefore, believe that under the circumstances here it
is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies
as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.
• . . It is for the federal courts "to adjust their remedies so
as to grant the necessary relief" where federally secured
rights are invaded. "And it also well settled that where legal
rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for
a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may
use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." 65
Borak was expansively interpreted in Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin6
where a corporation was, in effect, permitted the same enforcement
powers as the SEC in a suit to enjoin a proxy violation. Defendants
had solicited authorizations from shareholders to be used in a New
York state court action to obtain a shareholders list. The court held
that such a solicitation, without a prior filing with the SEC, violated
the proxy rules. In discussing whether the federal anti-injunction
statute 67 should bar private actions to enjoin proxy violations, the
Second Circuit refused to distinguish between enforcement by the
SEC and by a private party:
If the policy of the anti-injunction statute is superseded by
the need for immediate and effective enforcement of federal
securities regulations and statutes, the fact that enforcement
here is by a private party rather than the agency should not
be controlling. The Surpeme Court has recognized such a
suit as being "a necessary supplement to Commission action"
in providing the protection for investors contemplated by
the statute.6
The fact that little or no damage was proved in Gittlin was not deemed
decisive 69 and did not prevent private injunctive relief as an adjunct
to SEC action.7"
05377 U.S. at 433, quoting in part from Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
66 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). Gittlin. was a related proceeding to the Stude-
baker case, both concerning a proxy battle for control of the Studebaker Corporation.
6728 U.S.C. §2283 (1964).
"s 360 F.2d at 698, quoting in part from J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964).
9The court noted that a discussion of "irreparable injury . . . generally pro-
duces more dust than light," 360 F.2d at 698, and continued:
A plaintiff asking an injunction because of the defendant's violation of a
statute is not required to show that otherwise rigor mortis will set in forth-
with; all that "irreparable injury" means in this context is that unless an
injunction is granted, the plaintiff will suffer harm which cannot be repaired.
At least that is enough where, as here, the only consequence of an injunction
is that the defendant must effect a compliance with the statute which he
ought to have done before. . . . [T]he district court could properly have
considered that the public interest in enforcing the Proxy Rules outweighed
any inconvenience to Gittlin in having to start again.
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
7OBut cf. Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), which
dismissed an action because there was no causal relationship between the alleged
1967]
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The line of reasoning by which the Borak and Gittlin courts
found that equitable relief to enforce section 14(a) was proper is
equally applicable to section 10(b). Both sections proscribe unfair
and undesirable practices which prevailed in securities transactions
prior to the act. If a private party may help the SEC police one, it
should be able to help police the other. The structure of the two sec-
tions is also similar: section 10(b) makes it unlawful to employ any
"cmanipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in securities trans-
actions "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Com-
mission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors"; "' section 14(a) declares it unlaw-
ful to solicit proxies "in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 72 To hold that
the Borak rationale cannot extend to section 10(b) and that the
standing granted in the Ruckle case is incorrect would not be consonant
with the general trend of recent decisions in the securities area which
have favored an expansive interpretation of the act to eliminate un-
desirable practices.7"
There are several sound policy arguments for allowing a corporate
issuer to maintain an action for injunctive relief in rule lOb-5 cases.
The corporation is in a markedly better position to protect its share-
holders' interests than are the shareholders themselves. The corpora-
tion's managers have current information as to the value of the corpo-
rate assets and such factors as estimated future earnings which tend
to determine market price. They also will probably be the first to
recognize an illegal manipulation of the stock. The corporation is also
better able financially to bring a suit promptly before substantial
damage is done to the shareholders.74
Although the injured or potentially injured party may have an
adequate remedy at law for damages subsequent to the fraud, an injunc-
violation of § 14(a) and the injury claimed. Defendant owned 73% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation and any misleading material in the proxy statement would
not affect a merger vote even if the minority were deceived. The court's reasoning
is questionable because a full disclosure might have provoked a minority suit for an
accounting which could have forced the exchange rate of the stock to such a level
that defendant would not have gone through with the merger.
7148 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
7248 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §78n(a) (1964).
73 See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961) (an "issuer" determined to be a "seller" for the
purposes of rule 10b-5 litigation) ; Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965). See also the many recent cases in which
privity of contract was not required to maintain a 10b-5 action. Cooper v. North
Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Pettit v. American Stock
Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp.
239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 249
(6th Cir. 1962) (dictum). The continued expansion of corporate common law under
the Exchange Act is predicted in Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 627, 685 (1963).
74 See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1964).
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tion is an appropriate corporate remedy. It is far better to allow one
injunctive proceeding, than perhaps scores of individual damage
suits after the fact.7-5  Furthermore, the Exchange Act of 1934 was
designed to prevent manipulation and frauds; 7' damage actions are
an outgrowth from the act to compensate those who have been injured
when the damage was not prevented.77
In the R-tckle case, a derivative suit to enjoin issuance of securi-
ties although the damage would be to the shareholders, the court recog-
nized the necessity of the corporate action:
Barring suit by a corporation defrauded under those circum-
stances would, as a legal and practical matter, destroy any
remedy against the perpetrator of the fraud. Suits by individ-
ual shareholders would either run afoul of privity require-
ments . . . or result in smaller recoveries based on loss to
individual investments, which would also be difficult to
compute.78
Further support for the corporation's right of action comes from
the fact that the company is often irreparably injured by a manipulation
of its stock. An artificial depression of the market price would hamper
any merger negotiations then in progress, could cause termination
of or loss in an issuance of stock and would interfere with the corpora-
tion's ability to raise funds by borrowing against treasury shares. A
manipulation of the price upward could also interfere with the raising
of capital or with other corporate activities.
If it is concluded that a corporation does have standing to sue,
courts will then have to face questions as to possible limits to the
corporate action and as to what other parties, if any, might avail
themselves of this rationale to bring an action. For example, courts
might refuse an action when management's main objective in seek-
ing an injunction is to maintain corporate control.70 On the other
hand, it might be entirely permissible to extend the action to parties
which have a legitimate interest in maintaining a fair market value
for the stock-such as a bank which holds a substantial block of the
manipulated security as collateral on a loan, or a stock exchange on
whose floor the manipulation is taking place."0 Stockholders, as well,
might be permitted to bring derivative actions in the corporate name.81
7 See text accompanying note 78 infra.
76H.R. Res. 363, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
77The private right to sue for damages was implied through § 27 in Kardon v.
NVational Gypsum Co. and other cases. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
78 339 F.2d at 28. (Emphasis added.)
7o See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
So There is the possibility that management might employ misrepresentations or
other deceptive practices to defeat a tender offer and thus retain its control. See
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. R-v.
317, 360-64 (1967). The rationale expressed in this Comment might make injunctive
relief available to the offeror.
81 Granting the corporation standing to seek an injunction in the situation pre-
sented in Studebaker by no means dictates that a stockholder suing derivatively be
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Though it may seem radical to confer upon a private party the
same powers of enforcement as the SEC, it would advance the
overall policies supporting section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "to keep
the channels of interstate commerce . . . pure from fraudulent schemes,
tricks, devices, and all forms of manipulation." "2 The current trend
in the rapidly developing area of securities regulation is toward a
liberal interpretation of the act to compel strict compliance with its
requirements and the rules promulgated under it. The decisions
ameliorating the impact of the purchaser-seller limitation in rule
lOb-5, eliminating the need for privity between the defrauder and the
defrauded and enjoining violations of the proxy rules, all interpret the
law liberally to permit private actions to remedy the wrong done by a
violation of the Exchange Act. It would not be a radical departure
to grant injunctive relief to a corporation whose securities are being
manipulated on the market.
granted standing. Several of the policy arguments in favor of giving standing to the
corporation in the Studebaker situation would not be applicable to derivative suits
-specifically, those which relate to management's greater access to relevant infor-
mation. It might be decided, therefore, to relegate shareholders to their individual
remedies if management refuses to bring suit in the corporate name. On the other
hand, it might be argued that the "policing" function of the securities acts would be
furthered by permitting the individual shareholder to sue derivatively on behalf of
the corporation (and seek reimbursement from the corporate treasury if he is success-
ful). Under the rationale proposed in this Comment for granting standing to the
corporation where suit is instituted by management, there seems to be little reason
to distinguish derivative suits which are similar to Studebaker, in that the relief sought
is injunctive and the defendants are "outsiders." Where management is alleged to
have engaged in the challenged activity, there exists the danger that "strike-suiters"
will be bought off by management with corporate funds, thus further harming the
corporation and defeating the "policing" function served by allowing corporate stand-
ing. Of course, it could be argued that it is in the latter class of cases that the
derivative suit remedy is most necessary. And see FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 (requiring
court approval of all settlements of derivative suits).
8 2 Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
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